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There is a broad consensus that sustaining growth in poor countries is a challenge not 
only because the right economic policies have to be identified but also because 
policies have to be supported by appropriate governance capabilities, which in poor 
countries are correspondingly weak. Weaknesses in governance have therefore 
received a great deal of attention in Africa and other poorly performing areas of the 
world. However, there is much less agreement about the specific governance 
capabilities that are required to trigger and sustain growth in countries at different 
levels of development and facing different development problems. This chapter points 
out ideological, methodological and historical differences in the ways that governance 
is understood by making a distinction between the dominant liberal approach to 
governance, which we call ‘market-enhancing’ governance (and which is generally 
referred to as good governance), and an alternative view of governance appropriate 
for developing countries which draws on the historical evidence of catching up. We 
describe the alternative approach as ‘growth-enhancing’ governance.  
 
The divide between these approaches is not just about the underlying economic theory 
and reading of history. Their differences touch on broader differences within 
economics and the social sciences about how relevant knowledge about social change 
and policy can be acquired and tested with data and historical knowledge. As such, 
the debate about governance also flags deeper differences within the social sciences 
that policy-makers need to be aware of. Methods of research and testing of hypotheses 
are not ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ because it is very difficult to disprove the validity or 
otherwise of broad analytical methods. Instead, we can at least make policy-makers 
aware of the differences between methods, the strengths and weaknesses of each, and 
allow them to assess the plausibility of competing explanations and their applicability 
and appropriateness for their particular context.  
 
Governance refers to how state and society interact. Therefore questions about 
governance cannot be separated from broader questions about the economic role of 
the state in sustaining growth. Many of the dominant views on governance reform 
priorities for developing countries implicitly draw on a particular view of the role of 
the state that is based on a view of markets as largely able on their own to allocate 
resources and draw forth entrepreneurial capabilities that are necessary for sustaining 
economic development. This view argues that the appropriate governance capabilities 
to ensure growth and development should be market-supporting governance 
capabilities to maintain a rule of law, stable property rights, control corruption and 
operate political institutions that ensure accountability through democratic processes.  
 
This view, which we describe as the liberal ‘good governance’ or ‘market-enhancing’ 
approach draws heavily on contemporary advanced capitalist countries as models for 
the types of governance capabilities developing countries should be trying to achieve. 
Apart from the weakness of the underlying theoretical models, the empirical support 
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for this view comes from a particular reading of the empirical and historical evidence 
that is partial and in many respects seriously misleading. The long run correlation 
between the emergence of liberal market-enhancing institutions and prosperity is not 
in question. What is in question is the importance of these institutions as sufficient or 
even necessary conditions for supporting growth and development in poor countries at 
early stages of development. Here, the historical evidence on processes of change 
does not provide strong support for the good governance or market-enhancing view of 
governance priorities. This alone has important implications for the plausibility of the 
reform agenda that flows from it. 
 
The good governance or market-enhancing governance approach is part of a much 
broader tradition within modern liberal economics which develops economic models 
from a minimal set of ‘plausible’ first principles and then looks to cross-country or 
historical evidence using regression analysis on relatively large data sets to see if 
particular hypotheses are rejected or supported. This approach to evidence and proof 
does not work too well in any branch of economics because if data have to be 
available for every country we are limited to working with variables that have to be 
‘coarsely’ defined to give a value in every country. This is particularly problematic if 
an assessment of long historical processes is involved. If we have a prior presumption 
that history worked in a particular way, and if we keep looking at this type of coarse 
data, we will eventually find some way of working on the data or some bits of history 
that appear to fit. If enough economists start working with these models and the 
available data in the same way, soon the hypotheses take on the appearance of truth.  
 
Alternative approaches to social understanding start from historical readings of 
processes of change and transformation in different countries and then attempt to 
build plausible theoretical models of historical change. An immediate advantage of 
the alternative approach is that while processes of social change may be broadly 
similar across countries, very different combinations and even types of variables may 
have provided solutions to similar problems in different countries. But this requires a 
demanding combination of historical, political, social and economic knowledge. It 
also draws more heavily on case studies and comparisons of groups of countries using 
case studies. The plausibility of these theories is based on the plausibility of the 
historical analysis and comparisons of increasingly large numbers of case studies, but 
the nature of the data in these theories often precludes tests using cross-country 
regression analysis. It is important to point out that there is no consensus within 
economics or other social sciences about the relative merits of different 
methodologies. Nevertheless, it is important for us to be aware that the use of any 
particular methodological approach has advantages and disadvantages, particularly if 
each is likely to give different answers. In the end, it is up to each of us to decide 
which approach is more plausible and more likely to provide workable policies and 
approaches for the broader reform process in each country.  
 
Thus, these alternative approaches to governance not only take a different position on 
theoretical aspects of how markets and states work, but often derive this analysis from 
different methods of reading the processes of economic transformation in developing 
countries. For instance, a historical method of looking at the emergence of market-
enhancing governance capabilities in contemporary advanced countries soon shows 
that no country achieved significant ‘good governance’ capabilities before they 
developed. Once persistent historical processes are identified we can begin to look for 
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general theoretical reasons to explain why these patterns exist. It turns out that good 
governance capabilities are actually capabilities of delivering significantly expensive 
public goods and it is difficult if not impossible to achieve this to any significant 
degree in very poor economies with limited fiscal resources. Since some countries 
nevertheless developed, we have to conclude that good governance as it has been 
defined cannot plausibly be a precondition for development. Thus, the problem of 
looking at the cross-country data in an ahistorical way is that the dominant 
governance models miss more important questions about the processes through which 
market-enhancing governance itself developed. How did successful countries achieve 
better governance as described by good governance characteristics? Did they conjure 
up good governance before they developed and develop as a result? Or did they have 
other governance capabilities that allowed them to grow and then sequentially 
develop aspects of good governance as the growth process generated resources to pay 
for the public goods that good governance represents?  
 
The case study evidence from the successful developers of the last century which we 
have reviewed elsewhere shows that the growth process is much better described by 
the second type of process (Khan 2000b, 2002, 2004a, 2005, 2006). Successful 
countries had critical ‘growth-promoting’ governance capabilities that allowed them 
to sustain growth but these were very different from the capabilities identified by the 
dominant liberal good governance consensus. As they grew, characteristics described 
by the good governance model did indeed emerge, and did indeed assist their 
economic performance in some ways as they emerged. As a result, if we look at the 
cross-country data we can indeed find ‘proof’ that good governance is associated both 
with higher incomes and to a weaker extent even with growth. But these correlations 
do not tell us how the successful countries actually achieved and sustained growth. 
They miss out the critical process questions that would help us identify vital growth-
enhancing governance capabilities. But these are the only questions of much interest 
for developing economies who want to know what they should be doing.  
 
Instead of the broad public goods describing good governance we find that successful 
countries instead had a more limited and specific set of capabilities and political 
arrangements that allowed their states to push accumulation, technology acquisition, 
resource allocation and political stabilization in very difficult contexts using an array 
of pragmatic strategies that differed from country to country. Some of these 
developers were dramatically successful, others less so. Their governance capabilities 
and political arrangements also display considerable variation across countries. This 
variation and the absence of a blue print has been a disadvantage for the historical 
approach because policy advisors from advanced countries have tried to protect 
developing countries from the possibility of making mistakes that comes from the 
absence of hard guidelines. But the attempt to protect developing societies from the 
dangers of policy autonomy is not only deeply patronizing it can be deeply damaging 
as well. Even if some states have made serious and costly mistakes in the past and 
even if there were such things as ‘right policies’ known to more intelligent policy-
makers from other countries, societies cannot be put on sustainable growth paths by 
introducing the ‘right’ policies and limiting the autonomy of their states to make 
variations.  
 
Growth requires a continuous adaptation to changing economic and political 
circumstances and this most vital capability can be destroyed or prevented from 
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developing by the assumption that policy autonomy is dangerous and developing 
countries need to be protected from too much autonomy for their policy-makers. Even 
the most ideological supporters of market economics will concede that within broad 
limits sustaining growth requires a significant amount of policy autonomy to respond 
to crisis and challenge in creative ways. Indeed, crisis and challenge can be created by 
the operation of markets themselves, a fact that we are temporarily reminded of 
during deep global crises and then tend to forget very rapidly. More seriously, the 
historical reality is that the ability to act autonomously may be even more important at 
earlier stages of development because there is actually a much wider range of 
variation in successful strategies of social transformation than would be conceded by 
market-fundamentalist economists.  
 
Sustaining growth and development requires nothing less than the transformation of 
pre-capitalist and largely agrarian societies into modern productive ones. These 
processes involve interlinked strategies of accumulation, technology acquisition, and 
the management of deeply conflictual processes of social and class transformation. 
Given that societies start with different political, social and economic histories, it is 
hardly surprising that there is no blueprint of transformation that we can discern in 
actual history. The real irony is that in sanitizing the messiness of history, the 
sequence of reforms identified in the good governance strategy identifies a series of 
reform steps that were never actually successfully followed as reform priorities by any 
real country making the transition from poverty to development. The danger is that by 
setting the apparently plausible set of good governance capabilities as the priority 
policy goal for developing countries, policy-makers may have set them a task that 
they cannot possibly achieve. 
 
The ‘growth-enhancing’ approach to governance not only draws on a richer historical 
experience, it is also supported by a wide range of economic theory that shows that 
the state plays a fundamental transformational role in the transition to development 
(Stiglitz 1987, 1989b, 1989a; Khan 2004a, 2007a; Stiglitz 2007). This is partly 
because ‘market failures’ are endemic in all economies, particularly in developing 
ones. The liberal economics approach assumes that most market failures are caused 
by bad states intervening in silly ways (and indeed examples of such interventions are 
easily found). Therefore the solution to market failures in the dominant view is to get 
the state out of the economy, and to focus on governance capabilities that allow 
markets to work better. But in reality there are many significant market failures that 
would still remain, particularly in developing countries where a reasonably effective 
market is difficult to construct for structural reasons to do with the cost of providing 
the vital governance-related public goods. In these contexts, successful development 
requires the identification of significant market failures (which may be different in 
different countries) and finding solutions to them that limit the risk of government 
failure. As the political and social conditions of countries determine the types of likely 
government failures, successful solutions are likely to vary across countries. The 
growth-enhancing governance agenda is about identifying significant market failures 
country by country, and developing the capabilities to respond to them in ways that 
limit the risk of government failures. Far from reducing the autonomy of states, this 
approach seeks to create strong capabilities (as much as is possible in each country) to 
discover and find solutions appropriate to their conditions.  
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The absence of blueprints is therefore a feature of the historical problem, not a 
weakness of the historical methodology. As the internal political histories and class 
structures of countries are different, as well as their economic problems, it is not 
surprising that there are no blueprints for successful growth-promoting governance. 
Nevertheless, even if blueprints are not available, the growth-enhancing governance 
analysis can give political leaders, state officials, emerging entrepreneurs and 
representatives of other classes and groups in developing countries alternative sets of 
questions about the goals of governance in societies going through developmental 
transformations. Ultimately, societies have to devise their own political compromise 
and governance institutions that can pragmatically address their growth challenges as 
best as possible given their specific historical and political constraints. The policy 
priority for poor countries is not to measure themselves against good governance 
scores and attempt to improve these scores but to identify areas of governance that are 
most likely to make a difference to the growth challenges they face.  
 
Governance and Institutions  
Economic development requires an appropriate framework of institutional rules to 
accelerate and sustain growth and achieve other social objectives. A framework of 
rules creates the incentives and opportunities that promote growth and social 
objectives as well as creating sanctions for behaviour that is counterproductive. This 
much is widely recognized by policy-makers in both developing and advanced 
countries. The question for poor developing countries is a more specific one. These 
countries uniformly suffer from weak governance capabilities, so in principle 
improvements along a wide variety of fronts could be called for. The specific problem 
is therefore to identify the most important rules and developing the appropriate 
governance capabilities for enforcing these rules. 
 
A distinction immediately emerges between institutional rules that may be optimal in 
terms of economic theory or in terms of observations of how more advanced and 
successful countries operate and rules that can actually be enforced given the 
historical and political conditions of particular countries. When Douglass North 
(1990) defined institutions as rules, he was careful to point out that the existence of a 
formal rule meant little if it could not be enforced. The significance of this 
observation is often missed. Most developing countries have many rules that are very 
good rules on paper. In practice the reality is often very different. The discussion 
about governance priorities is therefore both about the particular rules that a 
developing country needs to enforce to accelerate growth and development, and also 
about the governance capabilities that need to be developed to enforce particular 
rules. If very ambitious public goods like a comprehensive rule of law cannot be 
effectively enforced then focusing on the enforcement of specific rules that are vital 
for economic performance, social justice or political stability may be crucial.  
 
The choice of rules and enforcement capabilities are closely related because if a 
particular set of rules cannot be enforced, focusing on those rules and governance 
capabilities may not be appropriate. The desirability of many rules that would work to 
make markets more efficient or contracts easier to enforce is often not in question. We 
may even find strong empirical support ‘proving’ the importance of some of these 
institutions when we compare less developed with more developed countries. We may 
find that the rules under discussion not only exist in more advanced countries, they do 
also work to make markets more efficient in the way theory suggests. But if it is 
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implausible to enforce some of these rules in any effective way in a particular 
country, or to make sufficient improvements in governance capabilities that would 
improve the enforcement of these rules over a reasonable time frame, these rules may 
be inappropriate as policy priorities in a practical sense.  
 
This may be obvious but is frequently ignored in policy discussions. Developing 
countries have often been criticized for attempting excessively ambitious 
interventionist programmes in the past. Often the very same countries are now 
regularly urged to embark on massively ambitious programmes of improving the rule 
of law, reducing corruption across the board, improving the accountability of 
government and other equally ambitious ‘good governance’ measures. These may all 
be desirable in their own right but they are unlikely to be achieved in the medium 
term to an extent that is likely to make a significant impact on the economic 
performance of the country. This does not mean that these reforms should not be 
pursued. Precisely because most of these reforms are desirable in their own right, they 
should indeed be pursued. But they cannot be the core of a growth-promoting strategy 
with immediate and intermediate objectives. Accelerating growth even in the medium 
term does require appropriate policies and institutions and these in turn require 
specific governance requirements if they are to be successfully implemented.  
 
From this practical perspective, the design of a growth promoting governance strategy 
must begin with a discussion of an economic growth strategy and its compatibility 
with the political economy of the country which determines its likelihood of 
implementation and enforcement. This suggests that the identification of the 
governance priorities for growth is likely to be an iterative process where the most 
promising growth strategies and complementary governance capabilities are 
simultaneously identified. Other things being equal, a growth strategy that is most 
likely to promote growth is one where the growth strategy has governance 
requirements that are likely to be delivered. As a practical question, we need to 
identify the critical governance requirements for particular growth strategies and 
make the achievement of these governance capabilities the priorities for governance 
reform.  
 
Governance and Growth  
The ability to compete in global markets has rightly been identified as an essential 
condition for sustaining growth. However, it is often wrongly concluded that since 
competitiveness is critical, it is sufficient to introduce free markets and expose 
domestic producers to the competitive discipline of global markets. If free markets 
mean the adoption of policies that prevent domestic producers getting assistance to 
achieve competitiveness in global markets, free markets may have very different 
effects on growth depending on the already pre-existing productive capabilities of the 
country. If domestic producers are far away from the global frontier of productivity, 
product quality and price, free markets could lead to a collapse of domestic productive 
capacity rather than a rapid improvement in productivity. The possibility that free 
markets could lead to divergence rather than convergence was most powerfully 
experienced by many developing countries during their colonial history when virtual 
free trade was accompanied in most cases by a growing divergence between 
themselves and the advanced countries.  
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For instance, from 1873 to 1947 Indian per capita income declined from around 25% 
of US per capita income to under 10% of the US level (Clark and Wolcott 2002). This 
happened during a period of virtual free trade as India was only allowed minimal 
tariff protection, a period when there was relatively strong protection of the rights of 
foreign (British) investors and virtually no restrictions on the repatriation of capital 
and profit. The proximate cause of this relative decline was simply that it was not 
profitable to invest in higher productivity manufacturing industries in India because of 
the low productivity of Indian workers, which was so low that even its low wages 
compared to the home country did not give India a competitive advantage for 
prospective British investors in most industries. This problem remains today for most 
sectors in most developing countries. Without any corrective assistance and strategies, 
the only areas that are likely to grow in a free-market economy are sectors which have 
already achieved international competitiveness. In most developing countries these 
are likely to be low technology and low value added sectors where the productivity 
gap with more advanced countries is likely to be low and the wage differential can 
more than compensate for this, giving the developing country a competitive advantage 
in these sectors. These are sectors like garment stitching, cut flowers, simple toy and 
shoe manufacturing or simple food processing and packaging. In the poorest 
developing countries technological capabilities may be absent even for the simplest 
technologies to take off. 
 
In theory, there are two broad types of policy responses to this problem, with different 
governance requirements. Both are responses to a common underlying problem which 
we need to first understand. Low productivity levels in a country may explain why 
investments in many areas are not immediately profitable but do not necessarily 
explain why investment to raise productivity in these sectors does not take place. If 
productivity can be raised through investment, and if wages are low, high profits are 
assured over time and this should typically pay for the additional time and risk 
involved in raising productivity. If this is not happening, we need to look at the 
market failures that may be preventing private investors from raising the underlying 
productivity at an acceptable level of risk. Many different market failures can prevent 
optimal levels of investment in late developers (Arrow 1962; Murphy, et al. 1989; 
Stiglitz 1989b; Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006). A market failure that has recently 
received attention is that involved in financing ‘discovery’ in developing countries 
(Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). The products in which a country may have competitive 
advantage are not known ex ante and require an investor to make investments to 
discover the underlying capabilities of the country. In many cases the investor will 
lose money, but investment can still be sustained if there are high profits for investors 
who strike it lucky. But if new entrants can easily enter the sectors that have been 
‘discovered’ they can bid up wages and raw material costs and wipe out the profits of 
the pioneers. The market failure is that it is not possible to protect the profits of the 
Schumpeterian investors in this case and the answer may be to provide carefully 
designed subsidies for startup firms in such contexts. This market failure assumes that 
there are innate competitive advantages that some countries have because they are 
better at producing some low technology products rather than others. Such innate 
advantages are not necessarily convincing for too many types of products and 
processes.  
 
Other market failures may be even more serious in preventing investment in new 
sectors in developing countries. We know that if new technologies take time to learn, 
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even if a country has a potential comparative advantage in a product it will not be 
immediately profitable (Khan 2000a). As a result, investors (whether private or 
public) will have to act as principals providing finance to firms, with managers and 
workers within these firms acting as agents undertaking the learning. Initially, the 
principals will be making a loss, but they expect to make a substantial profit 
eventually. In other words, learning, like innovation, requires some individuals to earn 
rents for a period, and like innovation, if these rents are mismanaged the outcome may 
be poor. The likelihood of success now depends on the effort the agents put in. In a 
world where contracts were perfectly enforced, investors could ensure that managers 
and workers receiving temporary rents will put in the optimal effort, and this would 
enable private investments to take place by making the risk involved acceptable. In 
reality, if contracts are difficult to enforce, it may be very difficult to enforce 
compulsions on firm-level agents. In these circumstances, private investors external to 
the firm may not be willing to take the risk of investing for productivity improvement. 
This is an example of a market failure that may condemn the developing country to 
low levels of investment in productivity-enhancing industries. 
 
This brings us to the two types of responses to these problems of market failure 
constraining growth in developing countries. The first response is to respond to 
specific market failures with narrowly defined interventions that create incentives or 
compulsions to move the outcome closer to what a more efficient market may have 
achieved. For instance, subsidies to investors may help to compensate for the costs of 
discovery or the higher uncertainty they face as a result of unenforceable contracts. 
Indeed, this was the type of intervention that was very common in the 1950s and 
1960s as developing countries attempted to reverse their performance under 
colonialism. This strategy was in the end disappointing in many developing countries 
because the range of market failures which policy-makers tried to address were too 
broadly defined, and in most cases existing governance capabilities were not remotely 
sufficient to enforce the requirements for success with such a range of interventions. 
While there were some attempts to improve the governance capabilities required to 
effectively manage these interventions, these governance requirements were not 
sufficiently recognized at the time.  
 
In the absence of a sufficient effort to develop these governance capabilities, 
interventions to correct market failures often resulted in poor outcomes in many 
countries. Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between corrections of market 
failures, rents and therefore the possibility of government failures of various types. By 
definition, any social attempt to correct a market failure creates new income flows and 
therefore rents. Indeed, the rents are potentially the mechanisms through which new 
incentives and compulsions are created. But for these rents to have the appropriate 
effect, governance capabilities are required that can enforce, withdraw or otherwise 
respond to the results. This does not mean that all rent seeking has to be ruled out, an 
impossible goal in any economy (Khan 2000b). The governance requirement is more 
modest, namely that the rent seeking does not disrupt the intervention to the extent 
that the net effect is low or negative. Many developing countries did not achieve this, 
and many rents that were created in the attempt to correct market failures were often 
wasted or captured by powerful groups who did not in the end deliver growth, or 
delivered insufficient growth.  
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Figure 1 Growth requires specific Growth-Enhancing Governance Capabilities 
 
Policies to correct specific market failures can result in a number of types of 
problems. First, there is a problem of moral hazard where policy creates some new 
benefits for some market participants but fails to achieve the desired policy goal. For 
instance, subsidies to assist training or making credit lines available to new startup 
companies to overcome capital market failures may simply be wasted without 
achieving the desired result. For this not to happen, governance capabilities of 
oversight and policy withdrawal are required so that the rents are not permanent and 
may be withdrawn if results are not achieved. The more narrowly defined the policy, 
the more plausible it may be to develop the governance capability to administer the 
policy reasonably effectively. A second problem is the policy-making agencies of 
government may get captured by rent seekers who may engineer solutions to market 
failures that do not really exist, simply to benefit from the rents created as a result. 
Limiting these possibilities require governance capabilities and political arrangements 
for ensuring that state capture cannot reach damaging proportions.  
 
Finally, policy responses to market failures may be politically controversial because 
the solutions to market failures may benefit particular constituencies or groups. The 
same market failure can be addressed by many different policy approaches with 
different distributions of benefits. For instance, environmental pollution can be 
addressed by taxing the emitter of pollution, by subsidizing the polluter not to emit, 
by regulatory limits on emission, or by creating property rights on emissions so they 
become tradable. Each solution has different transaction costs and therefore chances 
of success, but more significantly, has different distributions of benefits, even if the 
net social benefit of addressing the externality is the same in all solutions. What this 
suggests is that if in a particular solution the distribution of net benefits is excessively 
adverse for powerful or significant groups in society, or if they have significantly 
adverse welfare implications on marginal groups, then even if the policy enhances 
growth overall there may be resistance and opposition that in turn will have social 
costs in the form of conflict. Once again, success in solving specific market failures 
requires governance capabilities to ensure that the policies that are adopted do not 
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have excessively damaging political consequences in that specific context. The 
growth outcomes, satisfactory or otherwise thus depend both on the types of policies 
that seek to address market failures as well as on the governance capabilities that limit 
the possibility of government failures.  
 
Instead of responding to this experience with the conclusion that perhaps the range of 
interventions needed to be scaled back in some of the less dynamic countries to target 
critical market failures, and that critical governance capabilities needed to be 
developed, the response from the late 1970s onwards was to persuade poorly 
performing developing countries to abandon all attempts to address their market 
failures through specific interventions. The new strategy was to address market 
failures by making markets more efficient across the board. The two prongs of the 
new ‘market-fundamentalist’ strategy were to remove interventions (liberalization) 
combined with the development of governance capabilities that aimed to reduce 
market failures by making markets more efficient. This approach is summarized in 
Figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2 The Liberal/Good Governance Approach 
 
And so paradoxically liberal policy-makers began to incorporate the importance of the 
state and of governance capabilities into the reform agenda. But it was explicitly 
understood that the governance capabilities to be developed or strengthened were the 
ones necessary for the creation of efficient markets, not the capacities required to 
address market failures. While we agree that the results of intervention in many 
developing countries in the 1960s were disappointing, we draw a different set of 
conclusions about policy priorities. Interventionist strategies in the 1960s and 1970s 
were disappointing in many developing countries because the market failures were 
not carefully identified, and the interventions were over-ambitious and not tailored to 
the feasible governance capabilities of particular countries. Yet these strategies did 
succeed dramatically in a few countries which for historic accidents had the 
appropriate governance capabilities to enforce the strategies they had embarked on. 
The lesson we wish to learn from the history of our experiences with both the 
interventionist strategies of the 1960s and the more recent history of good governance 
reforms of the 1990s is that neither address the pressing problems of triggering and 
sustaining growth and development in poor countries. An alternative growth-
promoting governance strategy is to promote sequential and specific governance 
improvements tailored to effectively implement limited strategies that aim to 
overcome specific growth constraints in developing countries. Such an incremental 
growth-promoting governance strategy is most important for the least developed 
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countries given their limited capacities for making significant progress in the medium 
term on ambitious generalized governance improvement strategies (Khan 2008a). 
This does not at all suggest that good governance reforms should be abandoned, but 
that the acceleration and sustaining of growth requires serious attention to an 
alternative set of governance goals.  
 
Good governance: The theory  
The consensus behind the good governance agenda draws heavily on a large body of 
theoretical contributions that are part of the New Institutional Economics that 
emerged in the 1980s (North 1984; Matthews 1986; North 1990, 1995; Clague, et al. 
1997; Olson 1997; Bardhan 2000; Acemoglu, et al. 2004). The main theoretical links 
identified in New Institutional Economics that explain economic stagnation are 
summarized in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 Theoretical linkages underpinning the good governance agenda 
 
The fundamental link in all market-focused approaches is link 1 in Figure 3: 
economic stagnation and underdevelopment in poor countries is explained primarily 
by the persistence of inefficient markets. High transaction costs are simply a technical 
description of inefficient markets that suffer from extensive market failures. These 
high transaction costs are in turn explained by link 2: weak and contested property 
rights and unnecessary state interventions raise the costs of transacting in markets and 
create uncertainty which increases transaction costs. Unnecessary state interventions 
also create damaging rents signal lost economic opportunities. But link 3 shows that 
attempting to enforce property rights or to remove unnecessary government 
interventions will not work because these in turn are sustained by rent seeking and 
corruption, as privileged groups spend resources both legally and illegally to influence 
the state to distort property rights in their favour or create or distort interventions in 
their favour. There is a two-way causality here because weak property rights and 
welfare-reducing interventions also create incentives for rent seeking and corruption 
as individuals and groups try to work their way around these governance failures by 
bribing or influencing bureaucrats and politicians. Link 4 shows that rent seeking and 
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corruption in turn are sustained because although very small groups of people benefit 
from these processes, the majority is unable to stop the damage these groups do 
because of the absence of accountable government. So to fight corruption and rent 
seeking it is also necessary to reform politics and improve democratic accountability. 
Again, link 4 shows a two-way causality because rent seeking and corruption can also 
be used to subvert democracy in favour of the interests of small groups.   
 
During the time of the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, the focus of reform 
was limited to link 2 in Figure 3. At that time the belief was that by removing 
unnecessary state interventions the efficiency of markets would be enhanced. The 
expectation was that these reforms would suffice to make markets more efficient 
through link 1, as well as reduce rent seeking and corruption through link 3 in figure 4 
as these links operate in both directions. The new governance agenda adds to this the 
necessity of directly fighting corruption and rent seeking, as well as pushing forward 
with accountability reforms. The new belief is that only by attacking all the links in 
Figure 3 simultaneously is it possible to break out of the low-level development trap 
that many poor countries find themselves in.  
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Figure 4 The Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Agenda 
 
The multi-pronged policy agenda enshrined in the new good governance agenda is 
summarized in Figure 4. The new agenda suggests that unless all the links in figure 4 
were simultaneously addressed, market efficiency would not improve. The logic was 
that property right instability and welfare-reducing interventions could not be attacked 
unless rent seeking and corruption were directly addressed, and in turn, these could 
not be significantly tackled unless the privileges of minorities engaged in rent seeking 
and corruption that harmed the majority could be challenged through accountability 
and democratization. In addition, to promote democratic accountability, donors 
argued that states in poor countries should be encouraged to deliver services to the 
poor. Western donors, particularly in Africa have taken the line that poor countries 
should prioritize pro-poor spending financed by aid where necessary, and the poor 
should be mobilized through democratic processes to ensure that the state effectively 
delivers these goods and services (such as primary education and health care). Though 
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pro-poor service delivery directly tackles poverty, the broader case that is made for 
these reforms it that by empowering and raising the expectations of the majority (the 
poor), governments will become more accountable and this will feed into the broader 
governance reform agenda in the way shown in Figure 4. 
 
At the same time, civil society groups in developing countries often support attempts 
to enforce these rules on the grounds that many are highly desirable goals regardless 
of their economic efficacy. And finally, the fiduciary responsibility of donor agencies 
to protect taxpayer funded aid programmes has driven donor concerns about 
corruption and the diversion of resources in developing countries. This too has 
provided support for anti-corruption strategies and for accountability reforms. The 
convergence of support from multiple constituencies who are at loggerheads on most 
other issues explains why support for this particular reform agenda is so deep-rooted 
and pervasive. Suggesting an alternative or even complementary governance agenda 
requires the construction of a new constituency that may be quite difficult to achieve 
compared to the broad constituency backing the good governance agenda.  
 
A number of closely related measures of governance and approaches to reform have 
developed out of this framework, including the Doing Business surveys, Business 
Environment and Economic Performance surveys, and Productivity and Investment 
Climate surveys that are now produced by the World Bank and other agencies. These 
measure along different dimensions the degree to which states provide services that 
are consistent with market strategies. While there are differences between them, all of 
these measures fit in very well with the overall good governance agenda but look at 
micro-level indicators like the time it takes to get a telephone connection, the number 
of times a factory is visited by inspectors (the fewer the visits the better because 
inspections are assumed to create obstacles and provide opportunities for petty 
corruption), and business perceptions about the effectiveness of contract enforcement. 
What is common to all these measures is that there is no attempt to measure the 
success of a state in addressing market failures because it is assumed that any attempt 
to do so is itself counterproductive.  
 
The Evidence  
Support for the market-enhancing approach comes from cross-country regressions 
using measures of relevant governance capabilities to explain growth, often based on 
subjective assessments collected in surveys and expert opinions. An extensive 
academic literature has used this data to establish a positive relationship between 
market-enhancing governance conditions and economic performance (Knack and 
Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Barro 1996; Clague, et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Johnson, et al. 1998; Hall and Jones 1999; Kauffman, et al. 1999; Lambsdorff 2005). 
This literature typically finds a positive relationship between the two, supporting the 
hypothesis that an improvement in market-enhancing governance conditions will 
promote growth and accelerate convergence with advanced countries. We will 
summarize some of the problems with approaches using governance indicators as 
these are well known and have been extensively discussed elsewhere (Arndt and 
Oman 2006; Carlin, et al. 2006; Khan 2007a; Meisel and Aoudia 2008).  
 
The most important problem is that multiple directions of causality exist and are 
widely recognized. Even those who believe that market-enhancing governance 
capabilities have strong effects on growth also recognize that growth itself can 
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provide greater resources for the provision of market-enhancing governance. Much of 
the econometric effort is in trying to resolve these directions of causality. 
Econometrics is not very good in determining causality in general, but in this case the 
data series for different aspects of market-enhancing governance are only available 
from the 1990s in any extensive form, making credible causality tests even more 
difficult. As an example, the general problem can be demonstrated with reference to a 
single indicator, that for the rule of law, shown in Figure 5. This is an important 
component of measures of market-enhancing governance capabilities, and part of the 
set of World Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank.  
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Figure 5 An Example of the Evidence: ‘Rule of Law’ and Growth 1990-2003 
 
Without attempting any causality analysis, a visual examination of the data in Figure 
5 suggests why sophisticated causality analysis on this type of data may be very 
misguided. If all the available data on the rule of law score for 1996 (the earliest 
available year) are plotted against growth rates for the 1990s we do indeed get the 
impression that better rule of law will result in higher growth rates. But once we 
distinguish between advanced and developing countries (to address the possibility of 
reverse causation since advanced countries are expected to have a better rule of law 
anyway) the picture becomes muddied. Diverging developing countries (with growth 
rates lower than the median advanced country growth rate) had virtually the same 
mean and dispersion of their rule of law indicators compared to the high growth 
converging developing countries (whose growth rates were higher than the median 
advanced country growth rate). In other words, performance on the rule of law 
indicator does not appear to distinguish high growth from low growth developing 
countries. The same pattern emerges when we look at corruption indicators, indicators 
for political accountability or indeed any indicator of market-enhancing governance 
(Khan 2004a, 2007a, 2008b). Of course there are many other variables determining 
growth differences between countries, but the governance indicators are ‘deep’ 
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variables which are supposed to determine for instance the magnitude of investment 
and the efficiency of investment so if we fail to see any visual relationship at all it 
should alert us to some problem with the underlying hypothesis.  
 
(Source: Khan 2007b) 
Figure 6 Governance Characteristics of Growth Economies  
 
Our interpretation of the general problem is summarized in Figure 6. The 
characteristics of advanced economies are not really interesting for developing 
countries, nor is there any historical process evidence that reforms of the type 
suggested by good governance resulted in countries from group 1 reaching group 3. 
Our focus should rather be on group 1 and group 2 countries. Some critical 
governance capabilities allowed some group 1 countries to become high growth group 
2 countries, but in general it was not superior scores on good governance indicators. 
We also know that group 2 economies include many different types of growth stories, 
some more sustainable than others. Some converging economies have significant 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities that allow them not only to grow fast for a 
while, but to sustain this growth and spread it across the economy to make a sustained 
transition to prosperity. The North East Asian countries were examples of countries 
with such governance capabilities. Other countries may be in the converging group 
because they have some sectors or regions or minerals which produce globally 
competitive products but they may be quite vulnerable unless further growth-
enhancing sectors and capabilities are developed.  
 
The only thing that is clear is that developing countries do not in general solve the 
market failures that constrain their growth through good governance capabilities. In 
theory significant improvements in good governance characteristics may have helped 
to improve the efficiency of markets and thereby contributed to sustaining growth. 
But in reality such improvements are structurally beyond the reach of developing 
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countries which are significantly below upper middle income status. The cross-
country empirical evidence strongly supports that conclusion (Khan 2007b, 2008b).  
 
As the problems with supporting the good governance agenda using contemporary 
governance indicators are well known, attempts have been made to support the 
argument for good governance using instrumental variables and longer historical data. 
One of the most influential arguments frequently referred to in support of the good 
governance agenda comes from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (Acemoglu, et al. 
2001, 2002) henceforth AJR. But while their econometrics is impressive, they 
implicitly present an interpretation of history that is at variance with historical 
knowledge. The argument they develop is that ‘bad’ colonialism in non-settler 
colonies created unstable property rights because colonial powers in these countries 
were only interested in extracting resources. In contrast, they argue, ‘good’ 
colonialism in settler colonies created stable property rights because settlers wanted to 
live here and the result was prosperity. This comforting but deeply misleading 
narrative diverts our attention from the economics and politics of growth-enhancing 
property rights reform and the governance capabilities required by developing 
countries to sustain growth during their contemporary transitions. 
 
AJR’s innovation was to use exogenous proxy variables (settler mortality or low 
initial population density) as instruments for locating where white settlers settled and 
set up settler colonies. It has long been known that settler colonies did significantly 
better in achieving development than non-settler colonies. The problem that their 
instruments arguably correct for is that they ensure that the analysis does not pick up 
the possibility that white settlers settled in areas that had an advantage for some other 
reason. But in the end, their econometric sophistication says little more than 
something that is quite uncontroversial: white settler colonies did a lot better than 
other developing regions. The question is why? Here they make an assertion that has 
nothing to do with their econometrics. They assert that the reason was that settler 
colonies set up stable property rights while non-settler colonies set up extractive 
systems that disrupted property rights, apparently with lasting and persistent 
consequences. This reassuring version of colonial history, summarized in Figure 7, is 
becoming increasingly accepted as having been proved by their econometric exercise. 
 
Arrival of 
Non-
Settler 
Colonists
Extractive 
States with 
Weak 
Property 
Rights and 
Rule of Law
(Current) 
Low Per 
Capita 
Incomes
High 
Transaction 
Cost 
Markets
Pre-
Capitalist / 
Traditional 
Society
Arrival of 
Settler 
Colonists
Rapid 
Emergence 
of Stable 
Property 
Rights and 
Rule of Law
(Current) 
High Per 
Capita 
Incomes
Low 
Transaction 
Cost 
Markets
 
Figure 7 The Acemoglu et al. Version of Colonial History 
Source: (Khan 2009: Figure 7) 
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In fact, nothing of the sort is actually demonstrated in their work. All that their work 
demonstrates is that settler colonies ended up with significantly higher per capita 
incomes and higher scores in property rights stability a century or so later. AJR 
present no conclusive argument that the eventual outcomes were achieved because 
these states first established stable property rights and set up limited government. In 
reality, as Glaeser et al. point out, the same evidence could be used to argue that what 
the settlers brought with them was primarily their human capital (that is themselves) 
rather than their institutions, which arguably developed much later (Glaeser, et al. 
2004). What is worse, since the acquisition of human capital is in the long run a 
policy choice, a sophisticated racist could use the AJR evidence to argue that the 
superior performance of white settler colonies demonstrates the genetic advantage of 
whites in acquiring human capital (or indeed in setting up good institutions). AJR’s 
regressions only establish that white settler colonies did better (which no-one 
questioned anyway), and that where white settlers settled probably had little to do 
with the pre-settler productivity of the region. However, AJR’s own work shows that 
settler colonies were more likely to be set up in areas where indigenous populations 
were not dense (Acemoglu, et al. 2002). But they failed to pick up the significance of 
this for the historical processes through which social transformations were achieved.  
 
If anything, AJR’s story of expropriation can be turned on its head for the early period 
of colonialism in settler and non-settler colonies. The most obvious and striking fact 
about settler colonialism is the qualitatively more violent process that was unleashed 
on indigenous populations, verging on and in some cases amounting to genocide. The 
Belgian Congo was a possible exception to the rule that non-settler colonies faced 
lower levels of violence compared to settler colonies. In the non-settler colonies the 
colonial power faced dense populations that were relatively well organized and they 
immediately made complex political compromises with pre-existing and new elites to 
sustain colonial rule. In contrast, in settler colonies pre-existing populations were 
thinly spread out and the consequences of this turned out to be devastating for them. It 
meant that settlers could follow much more aggressive military strategies of land 
grabbing and destruction of pre-existing rights. Here indigenous populations faced 
dramatic and rapid expropriation of their lands, were pushed into smaller and smaller 
pockets of territories and in many cases suffered precipitous collapses in numbers that 
in some cases amounted to genocide.  
 
In North America the size of the ‘pre-contact’ American Indian population has been 
the subject of debate but the fact of its precipitous decline into near disappearance and 
the rapid and largely uncompensated loss of American Indian communal land rights is 
not (Snipp 1989; Sale 1990; Stiffarm and Lane Jr. 1992; Stannard 1993). In South 
Africa, the militarism and unwillingness to compromise that is evident for instance in 
the writings of Lord Garnet Wolseley during the Zulu Wars is in stark contrast to the 
strategies the British followed in India (Gump 1996; Lieven 1999). Indeed, Lieven’s 
description of the uncompromising ‘total war’ the British waged against the Zulus and 
their economy has elements of similarity with the German genocide of the Herrero 
people in neighbouring south-west Africa (Lieven 1999: 631) In Australia there is an 
explicit discourse of genocide to describe what happened to the aboriginal population 
(Tatz 1999; Moses 2000). Violence against aboriginal peoples in Australia was 
directly related to settler demand for land and the need to clear the land of the hunter-
gatherer aborigines. The simple expedient was to deny any recognition of prior rights. 
The forceful exclusion of aboriginal peoples from their livelihoods led to precipitous 
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population declines, in some areas by as much as 80 per cent (Moses 2000). To 
describe these processes in terms of the settler states establishing a rule of law and 
stable property rights clearly does huge injustice to our understanding of history and 
is at least manifestly economical with the truth. 
 
The inconvenient truth about the settler colonies summarized in Figure 8 is that they 
did indeed make a transition to ‘stable property rights’ but only after the rights 
inappropriate for the new capitalist economies were thoroughly destroyed. Settlers 
from already capitalist countries came with ideas of how to organize production but 
they did not try to work with pre-existing rights, defining them better, creating 
markets and a rule of law and then trying to re-allocate assets through voluntary 
contracts in markets. Instead, the transitions here were not periods of stable property 
rights but the absolute reverse. They were periods of systematic, widespread and 
violent destruction of almost all pre-existing rights because these rights did not serve 
the interests of settlers who were setting up capitalist economies in their own interest. 
Thus, this sophisticated econometric attempt to establish causality fails because its 
claim that stable property rights explain the higher growth of settler colonies does not 
stand up to the scrutiny of historical process. The social and economic transformation 
that created the preconditions for growth in settler colonies was carried out entirely 
outside the framework of a rule of law and a market economy based on contractual 
transfers of assets. The emergence of stable property rights, contracts and political 
accountability emerged in these societies after the critical transformations in 
economic, social and political structures had already been carried out, in these cases 
through processes of enormous violence.  
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Figure 8 Colonial History’s Inconvenient Truths 
Source: (Khan 2009: Figure 8). 
 
Paradoxically, pre-existing property rights were much better protected in the non-
settler colonies. For instance, Austin argues that in Ghana the colonial state supported 
productive African property rights and intervened to moderate monopsonistic 
behaviour by European commodity purchasers (2008: 1011). However, Austin’s 
examples of support for productive African property rights can also be interpreted as a 
demonstration of the willingness of the colonial power to support conflicting sets of 
rights out of political expediency. Thus, Austin provides an example where the British 
colonial power supported the rights of cocoa planters to the trees they had planted 
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under indigenous Akan land law even when the land did not belong to the chief of the 
planters. At the same time, the traditional rights of the chiefs were left intact. 
 
The complex political constraints driving colonial land property policy is even more 
obvious in the example of the British West Africa Lands Policy when British policy 
suddenly changed from supporting individual ownership of land in Lagos in 1861 to a 
newly discovered preference for ‘traditional’ land tenure in the Nigerian territories 
acquired between 1892 to 1903 (2008: 1009). The shift to a form of property right that 
was theoretically inferior for a capitalist transition cannot be explained by the 
presence of an extractive state of the Acemoglu et al. type since the non-settler 
colonial power had supported individual property rights in the immediate past and it is 
not at all clear how traditional land rights would allow more expropriation. A more 
plausible explanation is that the thinning out of British military power as its territories 
expanded led colonial administrators to prioritize the avoidance of social conflict and 
to seek to retain the support of the broadest possible definition of ‘traditional elites’.  
 
Consistent with this interpretation, a growing body of literature has corroborated 
critical aspects of Mamdani’s (1997) analysis of the ‘bifurcated state’. This argued 
that traditional or customary forms of tenure in Africa are largely colonial creations 
that had tenuous roots in pre-colonial history. The colonial power artificially created 
‘customary authorities’ as a method of exercising social, political and administrative 
control in a context where direct rule was difficult given the military and demographic 
disadvantage faced by colonial administrators in non-settler colonies. In these cases, 
colonial powers created new rights for the constituencies they needed, not for 
expropriating resources but to achieve political control in a context where they had 
limited roots in indigenous society. This perspective is supported by a considerable 
body of corroborating evidence (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). Clearly the 
recognition of traditional rights aimed to draw in different layers of traditional elites 
located in pre-colonial power structures. It is not surprising that non-settler colonial 
powers very often created conflicting and incoherent rights that could impede 
economic transformations.  
 
The analysis of settler versus non-settler colonialism is important for contemporary 
policy for several reasons. First, a historical understanding of the problems created by 
colonialism suggests that the challenge facing contemporary developing countries is 
not to create through good governance the stable property rights that settler colonies 
apparently created. A rapid creation of such rights is precluded once we understand 
what that would entail in terms of transition costs. Once these are taken into account, 
the settler colonies should serve as models of what not to do, because they solved the 
problem with a degree of violence that cannot be recommended today and was not 
justified in the past. If developing countries today are not following the example of 
settler colonies and moving rapidly in the direction of capitalist property rights it is 
not because they necessarily lack the political will, but more likely because they 
implicitly understand the issue of transition costs.  
 
Secondly, the long history of non-settler colonial rule has also left serious problems in 
the form of social engineering that created a multitude of rights and social 
entitlements that were inappropriate for asset re-allocations and for creating the 
productivity compulsions necessary for driving growth (Khan 2009). Finally, in the 
nineteenth century when settler economies were being set up, the technological gap 
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between leader and follower countries was not so great that significant market failures 
constrained investments particularly in the agricultural sectors of the settler colonies. 
Nevertheless, even at that early stage, the manufacturing takeoff needed tariffs and 
protection in settler colonies like the United States (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006). 
The refusal of non-settler colonial administrations in places like India to allow 
significant tariff protection for domestic manufactures till the early twentieth century 
resulted in the relative deindustrialization of India and its falling behind that we 
referred to earlier. In other words, there were significant differences in the growth 
strategies followed by settler and non-settler colonies but the differences had little to 
do with the mythology that settler colony growth was driven by their respect for 
property rights, rule of law and a minimal state. Yet, stable property rights and a rule 
of law did develop faster and deeper in the settler colonies as their capitalist sectors 
grew, became economically viable and started paying significant taxes that paid for 
their protection.  
 
Given the ahistorical governance advice that developing countries in Africa and 
elsewhere have received, it is not surprising that progress has been limited. The 
contemporary good governance agenda identifies areas of policy priority that are hard 
to justify on the basis of the historical evidence of capabilities and strategies of rapid 
developers in Asia and elsewhere. It is important to understand that we are talking 
about sequences and priorities. We are not saying that improving political 
accountability, fighting corruption or improving the rule of law is not a set of 
desirable goals for any society. Even if we all agree that these are desirable objectives, 
we still have to answer the question: how are we going to implement and achieve 
these governance capabilities? The answer may be that we need to achieve some 
intermediate and immediate growth-promoting governance capabilities to sustain 
growth which will eventually provide the resources to improve some of these market-
enhancing governance capabilities as well as achieve other developmental objectives. 
 
Growth-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth 
The historical evidence from Asia and elsewhere suggests that transitions to 
development have required strong state capabilities for dealing with critical market 
failures. The historical evidence that is available suggests that none of these countries 
would have passed the good governance test at early stages of their development and 
transformation. The role of the state in the ‘statist’ transitions in East Asian countries 
is widely recognized but liberal economists argue that these experiences cannot be 
replicated in other countries. If replication means the reproduction of any particular 
country’s blueprint in another, we would agree. But recent attempts to present settler 
colonies as examples of transitions driven by stable property rights and limited 
government are historical misrepresentations. In fact transitions in all countries 
required significant non-market activities by states and what is more, the degree of 
violence and injustice was significantly greater in the settler colonies compared to the 
East Asian examples. As strategies of transformation there is little to recommend the 
settler colonies. While no historical example provides a blueprint for contemporary 
societies, the growth-enhancing governance approach aims to identify broad structural 
problems that historical transitions addressed so that contemporary societies can 
address the problems of social transformation with greater social justice and with 
fewer costly mistakes.  
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In understanding the challenges facing Africa, we need to keep in mind the structural 
features of developing countries that require the development of growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities (Khan 2004b, 2005). These are capabilities that give states an 
ability to deal with critical market failures that in broad outline have faced all 
developing countries. Two areas in particular stand out as requiring close attention 
and country-specific responses. First, developing countries require governance 
capabilities to manage property rights over many valuable resources that will remain 
weakly defined during early stages of development. Historical evidence and theory 
suggest that contrary to good governance theory, the weakness of property rights in 
developing countries is structural and not entirely due to the extractive greed of 
political leaderships or their inadequate political will to enforce the rule of law. It is 
very expensive to protect property rights and enforce contracts to an extent that would 
allow most asset re-allocations to be organized through markets. The historical 
examples of successful development demonstrate that in the meantime, significant 
state capabilities for achieving vital asset allocations through non-market processes 
were vitally important. The differences between countries have been in their 
effectiveness, and in the degree of injustice and violence that was involved. The 
challenge is to achieve capabilities for allowing industrial and agricultural 
development through land allocation and other asset allocation strategies that achieve 
greater efficiency than existing high transaction cost markets together with as much 
justice as possible through fair levels of compensation and consensus building about 
social objectives.  
 
Secondly, market-led development is typically constrained by a variety of market 
failures that prevent investment in potentially high value sectors and the absorption, 
adaptation and learning of more advanced technologies. In particular, entrepreneurs 
face a structural problem in acquiring the tacit knowledge and learning required for 
using modern technologies essential for achieving international competitiveness. 
Achieving these capabilities requires complementary governance capabilities on the 
part of the state to manage incentives and opportunities for technological catching up, 
while creating compulsions for entrepreneurs not to waste resources. Countries differ 
widely in these capabilities, and therefore in their capacities to absorb new 
technologies rapidly. The experience of East Asia shows that the relevant state 
capabilities differed widely because the underlying strategies of technology 
acquisition were also significantly different between countries depending on their 
initial conditions of entrepreneurial abilities and technological trajectories.  
 
Technology acquisition strategies and complementary governance capabilities ranged 
from governments being able to effectively discipline subsidies for technology 
acquisition as in South Korea, licensing new technologies and providing them to the 
private sector as in Taiwan or attracting higher technology multinationals with 
appropriate incentives and conditions as in Malaysia (Khan 2000b; Khan and 
Blankenburg 2009). In each case strategies were more or less successful depending on 
the governance capabilities of the respective states to implement these strategies 
effectively. Very similar strategies failed to deliver good results in other developing 
countries because the appropriate governance capabilities for implementation were 
missing. Clearly, the initial conditions are more adverse in some African countries in 
terms of entrepreneurial skills and knowledge of technologies compared to the high 
growth Asian countries in the 1960s. Nevertheless, opening up markets and making 
the relatively small improvements in market-enhancing governance conditions that 
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are feasible are clearly not going to work in terms of attracting the necessary 
investments in learning and technology adoption. Identifying feasible strategies of 
building growth-enhancing governance capabilities in Africa based on these types of 
insights from historical evidence are likely to be more useful than the generalized 
good governance approaches that developing countries have been following.  
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